Compiled byEddie Yeghiayan
"On the so-called ‘Naïve Interpretation’ of ‘cogito, ergo, sum'." Acta Philosophica Fennica (1981), 32:9-29.
Studies in Cartesian Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind.
Philosophica Fennica, 33. Helsinki: Philosophical Society of Finland,
Includes 2 essays: "Descartes on the Essence of Mind and the Real Distinction between Mind and Body," pp. 9-103, and "On the Role and Nature of Descartes' First Principle," pp. 105-170.
"Philosophie de l'humanisme." Ajatus (1984), 41:141-167.
Edited (with Esa Saarinen and Ilkka Niiniluoto.) Rakkauden filosofia. Porvoo: Soderstrom, 1984.
"Descartes, Duns Scotus and Ockham on Omnipotence and
Possibility." Franciscan Studies (1985), 45(23):157-188.
William of Ockham (1285-1347). Commemorative Issue, Part II.
"Ockham and Descartes have been called voluntarists, Ockham has also been taken to anticipate Cartesian views on omnipotence and eternal truths, here examined against theories Descartes opposes. I argue that Duns Scotus, Ockham and Suarez define God's absolute power by absence of logical contradiction and take possibility to depend on things themselves, not on God. This, for Descartes, restricts God's infinite power to the sphere of conceivability determined by logical principles to which created intellects are bound. Descartes holds these principles to be made by God, hence, I conclude, they cannot be standards 'for' God, nor can voluntarism be applied to Descartes without qualification."
"On Descartes’s Argument for Dualism." In Simo Knuuttila and Jaako Hintikka, eds., The Logic of Being: Historical Studies, pp. 223-248. Synthese Historical Library, 28. Dordrecht & Boston: Reidel, 1986.
"Descartes, Omnipotence, and Kinds of Modality." In Peter H. Hare, ed., Doing Philosophy Historically, pp. 182-196. Frontiers of Philsophy. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, 1988.
"The Foundations of Modality and Conceivability in Descartes and
His Predecessors." In Simo Knuuttila, ed., Modern Modalities:
Studies of the History of Modal Theories from Medieval Nominalism to Logical
Positivism, pp. 1-69. Synthese Historical Library, 33.
Dordrecht & Boston: Kluwer, 1988.
"Descartes's view of modality is analyzed by contrast to two earlier models: the ancient realist one, defended by Boethius, where possibility and necessity are connected to natural potency, and the modern intensionalist one, which dissociates necessary and possible truths from any ontological foundation, treating them as conceptual, a priori given preconditions for any intellect. The emergence of this view is traced from Gilbert of Poitiers to Duns Scotus, Ockham and Suarez. The Cartesian theory of the creation of eternal truths, it is argued, involves a rejection of this idea of absolute conceivability and can be seen as a constructivist view of intelligibility and rationality."
"Descartes’s Dualism and the Philosophy of Mind."
Métaphysique et de Morale (July-September 1989),
"This paper examines Descartes's view of man and the understanding involved in the notion of the mind-body union. The aim is to spell out the implications of Descartes's distinction between different and incomparable primary notion and related kinds of knowledge, which due to the misleading but influential Rylean version of Descartes's mind-body dualism have remained largely unnoticed in the contemporary Anglo-American debate."
Review of John Cottingham’s Descartes. Journal of Philosophy (January 1989), 86(1):44-49.
"Descartes, Conceivability, and Logical Modality." In Tamara Horowitz and Gerald J. Massey, eds., Thought Experiments in Science.and Philosophy, pp. 65-84. CPS Publications in Philosophy of Science. Savage, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1991.
"Cartesian Ideas and Intentionality." Acta Philosophica Fennica
This issue is entitled "Language, Knowledge, and Intentionality: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Jaako Hintikka."
"Thought-Talk: Descartes and Sellars on Intentionality."
American Philosophical Quarterly (January 1992), 29(1):19-34.
"Descartes's concept of thought is often interpreted as internalist, in that thoughts are described as intentional inner states logically and causally prior to language. These thoughts are often identified with propositions. The externalist view, as described by Wilfrid Sellars, maintains that language is logically but not causally prior to thought. Descartes's actual position is neither internalism nor externalism."
"Une certaine fausseté matérielle: Descartes et Arnauld sur l'origine de l'erreur dans la perception sensorielle." In Jean-Marie Beyssade, Jean-Luc Marion, and Lia Levy, eds., Descartes: Objecter et répondre. Actes du colloque 'Objecter et répondre' organisé par le Centre d'études cartesiennes à la Sorbonne et à l'Ecole normale supérieure du 3 au 6 octobre 1992, à l'occasion du 350e anniversaire de la seconde édition des 'Meditationes'. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1994.
"Automata, Agency and Human Thinking--A Cartesian Meditation." Acta Philosophica Fennica (1995), 58:171-205.
"Reconsidering Descartes’s Notion of the Mind-Body Union."
Synthese (January 1996), 106(1):3-20.
This issue is entitled "Descartes and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind."
"Sensory Ideas, Objective Reality, and Material Falsity." In John Cottingham, eds., Reason, Will, and Sensation: Studies in Descartes's Metaphysics. Oxford: Clarendon Pess, 1994.
"Introduction." In Lilli Alanen, Sara Heinäma and Thomas Wallgren, eds., Commonality and Particularity in Ethics, pp. 1-13. Basingstoke: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997.
Edited (with Sara Heinamaa, and Thomas Wallgren.) Commonality and Particularity in Ethics. Basingstoke: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997.
(with Mikko Yrjonsuuri.) "Intuition, jugement et évidence chez Ockham et Descartes." In Joel Biard and Roshdi Rashed. Descartes et le Moyen Âge: Actes du colloque Descartes et la philosophie médiévale, pp. 155-173. Paris: Vrin, 1997.
"Intuition, Assent and Necessity: The
Question of Descartes's Pyschologism."
Acta Philosophica Fennica (1999), 64:99-121.
This issue is entitled "Norms and Modes of Thinking in Descartes."
"I discuss some psychologistic interpretations of Descartes's theory and the problems they pose. How should the freedom Descartes attributes to the will both in directing the attention and in giving the assent required for true judgment be understood? Is that freedom compatible with a psychologistic reading of Descartes's theory of assent? I try to shed some light on these questions by examining Descartes's view of intuition, its object and of the mechanisms of assent in the formation of judgment, and by contrasting it, tentatively, with some earlier views. I will also suggest an alternative reading which understands Descartes's account of judgment and rational inference in terms of voluntary normative commitment rather than in terms of psychological causation."
"Logical Modality and Attitudes to Propositions." In Georg Meggle, ed.,
Actions, Norms, Values: Discussions with Georg Henrik von Wright, pp. 211-226.
Perspectives in Analytical Philosophy, 21. Berlin & New York: de Gruyter, 1999.
"In discussing the nature and foundation of logical necessity Georg Henrik von Wright fights against a tendency to mystify necessity which Wittgenstein was fighting in criticizing the prejudice of the 'crystalline purity of logic' and the idea of the 'hardness of the logical must'. The necessity attributed to the principles or laws of logic is not founded on any preformed logical structure of the world but stems, von Wright argues, from an attitude we take to some propositions. This paper examines the view of logic and logical necessity that emerges from his paper on 'Logical Modality' and some of its implications. It outlines some traditional conceptions of modality and compares von Wright's view more particularly to Descartes's radical view of modality as dependent on the divine will and also to some contemporary views Descartes has been seen as anticipation. It purports to show that von Wright's way of detranscendentalizing modality by relating necessity to our attitudes or ways of treating sentences does not commit him to conventionalism or subjectivism."
"Cartesian Doubt and Scepticism."
Acta Philosophica Fennica (2000), 66:255-270.
This issue is entitled "Ancient Scepticism and the Sceptical Tradition."
Descartes's Concept of Mind.
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