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Department of Philosophy
(with Owen Flanagan.) "Zombies and the Function of Consciousness." Journal of Consciousness Studies (1995), 2(4):313-321.
(with Owen Flanagan.) "Natural Answers to Natural Questions." In
Valerie Gray Hardcastle, ed., Where Biology Meets Psychology: Philosophical
Essays, pp. 221-247. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, A Bradford Book,
Abstract: "The authors illustrate a way that biology and psychology can inform and transform philosophy of mind. They are concerned with how a process of reflective equilibrium among the special sciences could answer philosophical questions about mind. To demonstrate the value of their approach, they taxonomize the philosophical issues concerning the nature and status of consciousness and point to where biology or psychology will be useful in answering the questions. They also discuss the function and place of consciousness in cognition. In this chapter we consolidate and elaborate on our earlier work to show how the natural method, the method of seeking reflective equilibrium from psychology, neuroscience, and phenomenology, can lead to progress on the central questions about consciousness."
"Natural Minds." Ph.D. Dissertation in Philosophy, Duke University, 1999.
(with Dale Purves and Beau Lotto.) "Color Vision and the Four-Color-Map Problem."
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience (March 2000), 12(2):233-237.
Abstract: "Suggests that humans perceive four-color categories defined by unique hues because the visual system has evolved to solve a fundamental problem in topology, namely ensuring that no two areas separated by a common boundary in a two-dimensional array will appear the same if they are actually different. In topology, this issue is generally referred to as the "four-color-map problem." Four different colors are needed to make maps that avoid adjacent countries of the same color. Because the retinal image is two dimensional, like a map, four dimensions of chromatic experience would also be needed to optimally distinguish regions returning spectrally different light to the eye. The authors therefore suggest that the organization of human color vision according to four-color classes (reds, greens, blues, and yellows) has arisen as a solution to this logical requirement in topology. It was concluded that the hypothesis that the human color vision solves a fundamental problem in topology provides a novel way of thinking about an otherwise perplexing feature of color experience, namely why we see four categories of color, each defined by a unique hue."
(with Dale Purves and Beau Lotto.) "Untitled - Reply."
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience (September 2000), 12(5):911.
Reply to E.L. Schwartz and M. Cohen. "Untitled - Commentary."
Review of Jaegwon Kim Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation. Philosophical Psychology (March 2000), 13(1):135-139.
"Zombies." In Marco Nani and Massimo Marraffa, eds., Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind. Società Italiana Filosofia Analitica, 2000.
"Zombies Explained." In Don Ross, Andrew Brook, and David Thompson, eds., Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment, pp. 259-286. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, A Bradford Book, 2000.
"Consciousness, Adaptation and Epiphenomenalism." In James Fetzer, ed., Conscioussness Evolving. Amsterdam: Benjamins, 2001.
"A Critical Commentary on Dennett's Brainchildren. Philosophical Psychology.
(with Owen Flanagan.) "A Decade of Teleofunctionalism: Lycan's Consciousness and Consciousness and Experience. Minds and Machines (2001), 15(1):1-14.
"Consciousness, Function of." In Lynn Nadel, ed., Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. London: Macmillan Reference.
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