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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA IRVINE

DEPARTMENT OF LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

COLLOQUIUM

Robert Stalnaker

MIT

Friday, March 16, 200
4:00 p.m.
IMBS Conference Room Social Sciences Plaza-A, SSPA 2112

"Counterfactuals, Dispositions, and Games"

     Abstract: The formal representations of games provided by game theory contain information, not only about what happens as a game is played, but also about what would have happened if things had gone differently - about what players would believe and what they would do if the other players had acted differently - and this counterfactual information is important to the explanation and evaluation of what does happen. But counterfactual information remains for the most part implicit in the apparatus that game theory uses to define a game and to model the way it is played; it is reflected  in the specifications of  tree structures, information sets, strategies and conditional probability functions which are naturally interpreted as representing the causal structure of the game and the capacities and behavioral dispositions of the players. My aim in this talk is to make explicit the counterfactual information that is implicit in these specifications by adding to game models a semantics for conditional propositions. Semantic models for conditional logic, based on selection functions, or comparative similarity relations on possible worlds, apply naturally to game models, since the rich structure imposed by the definition of a game provides criteria for the comparative similarity relations on possible worlds that constrain the interpretation of conditional propositions. The application of conditional semantics to game models throws light in two directions: first, it helps to clarify some game theoretic concepts (such a the concept of a strategy) and some complex patterns of strategic reasoning; second, it brings into focus some general features of the problem of interpreting counterfactuals and helps to clarify the relation between counterfactual propositions and dispositional properties.

Robert Stalnaker

A Bibliography
Compiled by
Eddie Yeghiayan


I. Works by Robert Stalnaker

1967

1968

1969

1970

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1984

1986

1987

1988

1989

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1991

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1993

1994

1995

1996

1998

1999

2000

2001



II. Works about Robert Stalnaker

Reviews of Robert Stalnaker's Context and Content: Essays on Intentionality in Speech and Thought (1999)


Capone, Alessandro. Journal of Linguistics (July 2000), 36(2):454-455.

Reviews of Robert Stalnaker, William L. Harper, Glenn Pearce, edited, Ifs: Conditionals, Belief, Decision, Chance and Time (1981)


Bentham, Johan van. "The Continuing Story of Conditionals." Studies in Language (1982), 6(1):125-136.
Dancy, Jonathan. Philosophical Quarterly (1983), 33(130):96-98.
Nute, Donald. Philosophy of Science (September 1983), 50(3):515-520.
Picardi, E. Lingua e Stile (March-December 1982), 17:575-578.

Reviews of Robert Stalnaker's Inquiry (1984)


Baldwin, Thomas. Mind (October 1985), 94(376):627-630.
Barwise, Jon. Philosophical Review (July 1986), 95(3):429-434.
Cassam, Q. TLS Times Literary Supplement (1985), 4304:1052.
Cresswell, M.J. Linguistics and Philosophy (November 1988), 11(4):515-519.
Currie, Gregory. Philosophical Quarterly (October 1986), 36(145):569-571.
Dillon, J.T. Teaching College Record (1985), 87(1):139-141.
Forbes, Graeme. Synthese (April 1989), 79(1):171-189.
Field, Hartry. Noûs (March 1986), 20(1):74-75.
Field, Hartry. Philosophy of Science (September 1986), 53(3):425-448.
Field, Hartry. "Stalnaker on Intentionality: On Robert Stalnaker's Inquiry." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (1986), 67:98-112.
Malinas, G.A. Australian Journal of Philosophy (September 1986), 64(3):365-368.
Over, D.E. Journal of Semantics (September 1985), 4(3):271-.
Pendlebury, Michael. "Stalnaker on Inqury." Journal of Philosophical Logic (1987), 16:229-272.
Schiffer, Stephen. "Stalnaker on Intentionality: On Robert Stalnaker's Inquiry." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (1986), 67:87-97.

Discussions on Stalnaker
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