[Back to Index| UCI Department of Philosophy| UCI Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science| UCI Special Collections | UCI Libraries]
Department of Philosophy
"Physical Properties." Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1976.
Review of Paul Feyerabend's Against Method. Philosophical Review (January 1978), 87(1) :106-108.
"Generality and Nomological Form." Philosophy of Science (March 1979), 46(1):161-164.
"Maxwell's Condition--Goodman's Problem." British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (1979), 30:107-123.
"The Observational Uniqueness of Some Theories." Journal of Philosophy (April 1980), 77(4):208-233.
"The Double Standard in Ontology." Philosophical Studies (May 1981), 39(4):409-427.
"Predicate Meets Property." Philosophical Review (October 1982), 91(4) :549-589.
"Why Contingent Identity is Necessary."
Philosophical Studies (May 1983), 43(3):301-327.
Abstract:"This paper argues that the principle of necessary identity (F)(G)(F=G then necessarily F=G) cannot be maintained, at least in second order form. A paradox based upon scientific definitional practice is introduced to demonstrate this. A non-Fregean reading of standard contingent identity semantics is provided to explain how such 'definition breaking' works."
Review of George Bealer's Quality and Concept. Philosophical Review (October 1984), 93(4):636-638.
"What Is This Thing Called 'Pain'? The Philosophy of Science Behind
the Contemporary Debate." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
(July-October 1985), 66(3-4):227-267.
Special Double Issue: Topics in Philosophy of Science, edited by Geoffrey Joseph.
"What Can Theory Tell Us About Observation?" In Paul M. Churchland, and Clifford A. Hooker, eds., Images of Science: Essays on Realism and Empiricism, with a Reply from Bas C. van Fraassen, pp. 222-242. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985.
Review of David Armstrong's What is a Law of Nature? Philosophical Review (July 1987), 96(3) :435-441.
"Nature's Demands on Language." Philosophical Topics
(Spring 1988), 16(1):285-336.
Issue is on "Metaphysics."
Critical Notice: John Earman's A Primer on Determinism. Philosophy of Science (September 1989), 56(3):502-532.
"Law Along the Frontier: Differential Equations and Their Boundary Conditions." In Arthur Fine, Micky Forbes and Linda Wessels, eds., PSA 1990: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Volume Two: Symposium and Invited Papers, pp. 565-575. East Lansing, Michigan: Philosophy of Science Association, 1991.
"Reflections on Strings." In Tamara Horowitz and Gerald J.
eds.,Thought Experiments in Science and Philosophy.
Savage, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1991.
Abstract: 'This essay discusses a famous case where the demands of physical representation overpowered the demands of mathematical rigor. It concerns the dispute between Euler and d'Alembert over the vibrating string."
"Frege: The Royal Road to Geometry." Nous (June 1992), 26(2):149-180.
"Honorable Intensions." In Steven J. Wagner and Richard Warner, eds., Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal, pp. 53-94. Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame University Press, 1993.
"There's a Hole and a Bucket, Dear Leibniz." Midwest Studies in Philosophy (1993), 18:202-241.
"Can We Trust Logical Form?" Journal of Philosophy (October 1994), 91(10):519-544.
"Frege: The Royal Road to Geometry." In William Demopoulos, ed., Frege's Philosophy of Mathematics, pp. 108-149. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995.
"Mechanism and Fracture in Cartesian Physics."
Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy (1997), 16(2):141-152.
Topos: Descartes's Ontology, Guest editor: Alan Nelson.
Abstract: "Descartes's claims about impact and the relativity of motion in the "Principles" have puzzled many commentators. The present essay attempts to relate his thinking to natural principles governing the capacity of a closed mechanism to perform work. A clever approach to fracture forms an important addendum to this account."
"Wittgenstein, Physica Sunt, Non Leguntur." Philosophical
Topics (Fall 1997), 25(2):289-316.
Issue is on "Analytic Philosophy," edited by Christopher Hill.
"To Err is Humean." Philosophia Mathematica (October
1999), 7(3)Special Issue:247-257.
Part of the George Boolos Memorial Symposium at Notre Dame, April 15-18, 1998.
Abstract: "George Boolos, Crispin Wright, and others have demonstrated how most of Frege's treatment of arithmetic can be obtained from a second-order statement that Boolos dubbed 'Hume's principle'. This note explores the historical evidence that Frege originally planned to develop a philosophical approach to numbers in which Hume's principle is central, but this strategy was abandoned midway through his Grundlagen."
"Inference and Correlational Truth." In André Chapuis and Anil Gupta, eds., Circularity, Definition and Truth, pp. 370-395. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research; Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, 2000.
"The Unreasonable Uncooperativeness of Mathematics in the Natural
Sciences." Monist (April 2000), 83(2):297-315.
Issue is on "Applying Mathematics."
"Frege's Mathematical Setting." In Thomas G. Rickett's The Cambridge Companion to Frege. Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press.
"The Mathematics of Spilt Milk."
Copyright © All rights reserved. Regents of the University of