Philosophers are familiar with
functionalist accounts of various things:
properties, mental states, linguistic
meaning, and so on. How far should functionalist methods be extended? Far,
but not arbitrarily far, I want to
suggest. I shall argue for a functionalist theory of color properties, but
for a non-functionalist account of color
experiences. I hope to draw some morals about what makes a domain suitable
or unsuitable for treatment by a
functionalist analysis.
Department of Philosophy
"The Imagery Debate: A Critical Assessment." Journal of Philosophical Research (1996), 21:149-182.
Contributor to "Philosophy." In Robert E. Clark and John Palatella, eds., The Real Guide to Grad School: What You Better Know Before You Choose: Humanities & Social Sciences, pp. 263-285. New York: Lingua Franca, 1997.
"Frege and Psychologism." Philosophical Papers (1998), 27(1):45-67.
"The Reality of Psychological Reality: Chomsky and Matthews's Chomsky."
Celebration Project in celebration of
Noam Chomsky's 70th birthday, November 1998.
"Holism: Some Reasons for Buyer's Remorse." Analysis (April 1999), 59(2):63-71.
"Holism, Thought, and the Fate of Metaphysics: Counter-Reply to Heal." Analysis (April 1999), 59(2):79-85.
"Why Asymmetries in Color Space Can't Save Functionalism: Open Peer Commentary on Palmer's 'Color, Consciousness, and the Isomorphism Constraint'." Behavioral and Brain Sciences (December 1999), 22(6):950, 985-989.
"Analyticity and Katz's New Intensionalism: Or, If You Sever Sense from Reference, Analyticity Is Cheap but Useless." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (July 2000), 61(1):115-135.
"Color, Content, and Fred: On a Proposed Reductio of the Inverted Spectrum Hypothesis." Philosophical Studies.
Review of Two Recent Anthologies on Color. Philosophical Psychology.
"Subjectivism, Physicalism, or None of the Above? Comments on Ross's 'The Location Problem for Color Subjectivism'." Consciousness and Cognition.