Robert Stalnaker Bibliography

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA IRVINE

DEPARTMENT OF LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

COLLOQUIUM

Robert Stalnaker

MIT

Friday, March 16, 200
4:00 p.m.
IMBS Conference Room Social Sciences Plaza-A, SSPA 2112

"Counterfactuals, Dispositions, and Games"
Abstract: The formal representations of games provided by game theory contain information, not only about what happens as a game is played, but also about what would have happened if things had gone differently - about what players would believe and what they would do if the other players had acted differently - and this counterfactual information is important to the explanation and evaluation of what does happen. But counterfactual information remains for the most part implicit in the apparatus that game theory uses to define a game and to model the way it is played; it is reflected in the specifications of tree structures, information sets, strategies and conditional probability functions which are naturally interpreted as representing the causal structure of the game and the capacities and behavioral dispositions of the players. My aim in this talk is to make explicit the counterfactual information that is implicit in these specifications by adding to game models a semantics for conditional propositions. Semantic models for conditional logic, based on selection functions, or comparative similarity relations on possible worlds, apply naturally to game models, since the rich structure imposed by the definition of a game provides criteria for the comparative similarity relations on possible worlds that constrain the interpretation of conditional propositions. The application of conditional semantics to game models throws light in two directions: first, it helps to clarify some game theoretic concepts (such a the concept of a strategy) and some complex patterns of strategic reasoning; second, it brings into focus some general features of the problem of interpreting counterfactuals and helps to clarify the relation between counterfactual propositions and dispositional properties.

Robert Stalnaker

A Bibliography
Compiled by
Eddie Yeghiayan

I. Works by Robert Stalnaker

1967

"Events, Periods, and Institutions in Historians' Language." History and Theory (1967), 6(2):159-179.

1968

(with Richmond H. Thomason.) "Abstraction in First-Order Model Logic." Theoria (1968), 34(3):203-207.
(with Richmond H. Thomason.) "Modality and Reference." Noûs (November 1968), 2(4):359-372.
"A Theory of Conditionals." In Nicholas Rescher, ed., Studies in Logical Theory, pp. 98-112. American Philosophical Quarterly Monograph Series, 2. Oxford: Blackwell, 1968.

1969

"Wallace on Propositional Attitudes." Journal of Philosophy (November 20, 1969), 66(22):803-806.

1970

"Pragmatics." Synthese (December 1970), 22(1-2):272-289.
"Probability and Conditionals." Philosophy of Science (March 1970), 37(1):64-80.
(with Richmond H. Thomason.) "A Semantic Analysis of Conditional Logic." Theoria (1970), 36(1):23-42.

1972

"Pragmatics." In Donald Davidson and Gilbert Herman, eds., Semantics of Natural Language, pp. 380-397. 2d ed. Synthese Library. Dordrecht & Boston: D. Reidel, 1972.
Review of Jaakko Hintikka's Models for Modalities. Journal of Philosophy (August 17, 1972), 69(15):456-460.

1973

"Presuppositions." Journal of Philosophical Logic (October 1973), 2(4):447-456.
(with Richmond H. Thomason.) "A Semantic Theory of Adverbs." Linguistic Inquiry (Spring 1973), 4(2):195-200.
Review of Alan Ryan's The Philosophy of the Social Sciences. Philosophical Review (January 1973), 81(1):126-128.
Review of Henry Albert Finch's "An Explication of Counterfactuals by Probability Theory," Richard Jeffrey's "A Note on Finch's An Explication of Counterfactuals by Probability Theory," and Henry Albert Finch's "Due Care in Explicating Counterfactuals: A Reply to Mr. Jeffrey." Journal of Symbolic Logic (March 1973), 38(1):145-146.
"Tenses and Pronouns." Journal of Philosophy (October 1973), 70(18):610-612.

1974

"Pragmatic Presuppositions." In Milton K. Munitz and Peter K. Unger, eds., Semantics and Philosophy: Essays. New York: New York University Press, 1974.
Review of Ernest Adams' "The Logic of Conditionals," Ernest Adams, Jaakko Hintikka, and Patrick Suppes' "Proabability and the Logic of Conditionals." Journal of Symbolic Logic (September 1974), 39(3):609-611.

1975

"Indicative Conditionals." Philosophia (1975), 5(3):269-286.

1976

"Indicative Conditionals." In Asa Kasher, ed., Language in Focus: Foundations, Methods, and Systems: Essays in Memory of Yehoshua Bar-Hillel. Synthese Library, 89. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science (1976), 43. Dordrecht & Boston : D. Reidel, 1976.
"Letter by Stalnaker to van Fraassen." In William L. Harper and C.A. Hooker, eds., Foundations of Probability Theory, Statistical Inference, and Statistical Theories of Science, Vol. I: Foundations and Philosophy of Epistemic Applications of Probability Theory, pp. 302-306. The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science (1976), 6. Dordrecht, Holland; Boston: D. Reidel, 1976.
On Bas C. van Fraassen's "Probabilities of Conditionals," pp. 261-300. Followed by "Letter by van Fraassen to Stalnaker," pp. 307-308.
"Letter" to William L. Harper. In William L. Harper and C.A. Hooker, eds., Foundations of Probability Theory, Statistical Inference, and Statistical Theories of Science, Vol. I: Foundations and Philosophy of Epistemic Applications of Probability Theory, pp. 113-115. The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science (1976), 6. Dordrecht, Holland; Boston: D. Reidel, 1976.
On Harper's "Rational Belief Change, Popper Functions and Counterfactuals," pp. 73-112. Followed by Harper's "Ramsey Test Conditionals and Iterated Belief Change (A Response to Stalnaker)," pp. 117-135.
"Possible Worlds." Nous (March 1976), 10(1):65-75.
Commentators: John Pollock and John Wallace.
"Propositions." In Alfred F. MacKay and Daniel D. Merrill, eds., Issues in the Philosophy of Language: Proceedings of the 1972 Oberlin Colloquium in Philosophy, pp. 79-91. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976.

1977

"Complex Predicates." Monist (July 1977), 60(3):327-339.

1978

"Assertion." In Peter Cole, ed., Pragmatics, pp. 315-332. Syntax and Semantics, 9. New York: Academic Press, 1978.

1979

"Anti-Essentialism." Midwest Studies in Philosophy (1979), 4:343-355.

1980

Review of Gerald Gazdar's Pragmatics: Implicature, Presupposition and Logical Form. Language (1980), 56(4):902-905.

1981

Edited (with William L. Harper and Glenn Pearce.) IFs: Conditionals, Belief, Decision, Chance, and Time. University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, 15. Dordrecht & Boston: Reidel, 1981.
Includes by Robert Stalnaker: "A Theory of Conditionals," pp. 41-55; "A Defense of Conditional Excluded Middle," pp. 87-104; "Probability and Conditionals," pp. 107-128; "Letter to David Lewis, May 21, 1972," pp. 151-152; "Indicative Conditionals," pp. 193-210.
"Indexical Belief." Synthese (1981), 57:129-152.
"Logical Semiotic." In Evandro Agazzi, ed., Modern Logic--A Survey: Historical, Philosophical, and Mathematical Aspects of Modern Logic and its Applications, pp. 439-456. Synthese Library, 149. Dodrecht & Boston: Reidel, 1981.

1984

Inquiry. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, "A Bradford Book," 1984.

1986

"Counterparts and Identity." Midwest Studies in Philosophy (1986), 11:121-140.
"Possible Worlds and Situations." Journal of Philosophical Logic (February 1986), 15(1):109-123.
"Replies to Schiffer's 'Stalnaker's Problem of Intentionality' and Field's 'Stalnaker on Intentionality'." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (April 1986), 67(2):113-123.

1987

Inquiry. 1st MIT pbk. ed. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, A Bradford Book, 1987.
"Semantics for Belief." Philosophical Topics (1987), 15:177-190.

1988

"Belief Attribution and Context." In Robert H. Grimm and Daniel D. Merrill, eds., Contents of Thought, pp. 156-181. Series: Arizona Colloquium in Cognition. Proceedings of the 1985 Oberlin Colloquium in Philosophy. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1988.
Followed by comments by Hans Kamp, pp. 156-181.
"Possible Worlds and Situations." In Jack Kulas, James H. Fetzer, and Terry L. Rankin, eds., Philosophy, Language, and Artificial Intelligence: Resources for Processing Natural Language. Studies in Cognitive Systems. Dordrecht & Boston: Kluwer, 1988.
Review of David Lewis' On the Plurality of Worlds. Mind (January 1988), 97(385):116-128.
"Vague Identity." In David F. Austin, ed., Philosophical Analysis, pp. 349-360. Norwell: Kluwer, 1988.

1989

"On Grandy on Grice." Journal of Philosophy (October 1989), 86(10):526-527.
"On What's in the Head." In James E. Tomberlin, ed., Philosophical Perspectives, 3: Philosophy of Mind and Action Theory, 1989, pp. 287-316. Atascadero: Ridgeview, 1989.

1990

"Mental Content and Linguistic Form." Philosophical Studies (January-February 1990), 58(1-2):129-146.
"Narrow Content." In C. Anthony Anderson and Joseph Owens, eds., Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Logic, Language, and Mind. CSLI Lecture Notes, No. 20. Stanford: CSLI, 1990.
"Pragmatics." In A.P. Martinich, ed., The Philosophy of Language. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.

1991

"How to Do Semantics for the Language of Thought." In Barry Loewer and Georges Rey, eds., Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics. Philosophers and their Critics, 3. Cambridge, MA & Oxford: Blackwell, 1991.
"The Problem of Logical Omniscience, I." Synthese (December 1991), 89(3):425-440.
"Propositions." In Jay L. Garfield & Murray Kiteley, eds., Meaning and Truth: Essential Readings in Modern Semantics. Paragon Issues in Philosophy. New York: Paragon House, 1991.

1992

Review of Hilary Putnam's Representation and Reality. Philosophical Review (April 1992), 101(2):359-362.

1993

"A Note on Non-Monotonic Modal Logic." Artificial Intelligence (December 1993), 64(2):183-196.
"Twin Earth Revisited." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (1993), 93:297-311.
"What is the Representation Theory of Thinking? A Comment on William G. Lycan." Mind and Language (1993), 8(3):423-430.

1994

(with Richard Jeffrey.) "Conditionals as Random Variables." In Ellery Eells, ed., Probability and Conditionals. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
"The Interaction of Modality with Quantification and Identity." In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, ed., Modality, Morality, and Belief. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
"Letter to Brian Skyrms." In Ellery Eells, and Brian Skyrms. eds., Probability and Conditionals: Belief Revision and Rational Decision. Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction, and Decision Theory. Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
"Essays on Probability and Conditionals is intended to honor Professor Ernest W. Adams."
"On the Evaluation of Solution Concepts." Theory and Decision (July 1994), 37(1):49-73.

1995

"The Interaction of Modality with Quantification and Identity." In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Diana Raffman, and Nicholas Asher, eds., Modality, Morality, and Belief: Essays in Honor of Ruth Barcan Marcus. Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

1996

"Knowledge, Belief and Counterfactual Reasoning in Games." Economics and Philosophy (October 1996), 12(2):133-163.
"On a Defense of the Hegemony of Representation." In Enrique Villanueva, ed., Perception. Atascadero: Ridgeview, 1996.
"On the Representation of Context." Proceedings from Semantics and Linguistic Theory (1996), 6:279-294.
"On What Possible Worlds Could Not Be." In Adam Morton, ed., Benacerraf and his Critics. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1996.
"Pragmatics." In Heimir Geirsson and Michael Losonsky, eds., Readings in Language and Mind, pp. 77-88. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1996.
"Varieties of Supervenience." In James E. Tomberlin, ed., Metaphysics, 1996, pp. 221-241. Philosophical Perspectives (1996), 10. A supplement to Noûs (1996). Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1996.

1998

"Belief Revision in Games: Forward and Backward Induction." Mathematical Social Sciences (July 1998), 36(1):31-56.
"Los nombres y la referencia: semantica y metasemantica." Teorema (1998), 17(1):7-19.
"On the Representation of Context." Journal of Logic, Language and Information (1998), 7(1):3-19.
"Reference and Necessity." In Bob Hale and Crispin Wright, eds., A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, pp. 534-554. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Oxford & Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 1998.
"Replies to Comments." In Enrique Villanueva, ed., Concepts. Philosophical Issues (1998), 9. Atascadero: Ridgeview, 1998.
"Response to Bonanno and Nehring." Theory and Decision (December 1998), 45(3):297-299.
See their "On Stalnaker's Notion of Strong Rationalizability and Nash Equilibrium in Perfect Information Games" below under "Discussions on Stalnaker."
Review of M.J. Cresswell's Language in the World. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (March 1998), 58(1):241-244.
"What Might Nonconceptual Content Be?" In Enrique Villanueva, ed., Concepts. Philosophical Issues (1998), 9. Atascadero: Ridgeview, 1998.

1999

(with Ned Block.) "Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap." Philosophical Review (January 1999), 108(1):1-46.
Context and Content: Essays on Intentionality in Speech and Thought. Oxford Cognitive Science Series. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
Includes "The Problem of Logical Omniscience, II," pp. 255-273.
"Knowledge, Belief, and Counterfactual Reasoning in Games." In Cristina Bicchieri, Richard Jeffrey, and Brian Skyrms, eds., The Logic of Strategy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.

2000

"On Moore's Paradox." In Pascal Engel, ed., Believing and Accepting. Philosophical Studies Series, 83. Dordrecht & Boston: Kluwer Academic, 2000.

2001

Edited (with Alex Byrne and Ralph Wedgwood.) Fact and Value: Essays on Ethics and Metaphysics for Judith Jarvis Thomson. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, "A Bradford Book," 2001.

II. Works about Robert Stalnaker

Reviews of Robert Stalnaker's Context and Content: Essays on Intentionality in Speech and Thought (1999)

Capone, Alessandro. Journal of Linguistics (July 2000), 36(2):454-455.

Reviews of Robert Stalnaker, William L. Harper, Glenn Pearce, edited, Ifs: Conditionals, Belief, Decision, Chance and Time (1981)

Bentham, Johan van. "The Continuing Story of Conditionals." Studies in Language (1982), 6(1):125-136.
Dancy, Jonathan. Philosophical Quarterly (1983), 33(130):96-98.
Nute, Donald. Philosophy of Science (September 1983), 50(3):515-520.
Picardi, E. Lingua e Stile (March-December 1982), 17:575-578.

Reviews of Robert Stalnaker's Inquiry (1984)

Baldwin, Thomas. Mind (October 1985), 94(376):627-630.
Barwise, Jon. Philosophical Review (July 1986), 95(3):429-434.
Cassam, Q. TLS Times Literary Supplement (1985), 4304:1052.
Cresswell, M.J. Linguistics and Philosophy (November 1988), 11(4):515-519.
Currie, Gregory. Philosophical Quarterly (October 1986), 36(145):569-571.
Dillon, J.T. Teaching College Record (1985), 87(1):139-141.
Forbes, Graeme. Synthese (April 1989), 79(1):171-189.
Field, Hartry. Noûs (March 1986), 20(1):74-75.
Field, Hartry. Philosophy of Science (September 1986), 53(3):425-448.
Field, Hartry. "Stalnaker on Intentionality: On Robert Stalnaker's Inquiry." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (1986), 67:98-112.
Malinas, G.A. Australian Journal of Philosophy (September 1986), 64(3):365-368.
Over, D.E. Journal of Semantics (September 1985), 4(3):271-.
Pendlebury, Michael. "Stalnaker on Inqury." Journal of Philosophical Logic (1987), 16:229-272.
Schiffer, Stephen. "Stalnaker on Intentionality: On Robert Stalnaker's Inquiry." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (1986), 67:87-97.

Discussions on Stalnaker

Bonanno, Giacomo and Klaus Nehring. "On Stalnaker's Notion of Strong Rationalizability and Nash Equilibrium in Perfect Information Games." Theory and Decision (December 1998), 45(3):291-295.
Caton, Charles E. "Stalnaker on Pragmatic Presupposition." In Peter Cole, ed., Radical Pragmatics, pp. 83-100. New York: Academic Press, 1981.
Creath, Richard. "Counterfactuals for Free." Philosophical Studies (1989), 57:95-101.
Falk, Arthur E. "Ifs and Newcombs." Canadian Journal of Philosophy (1985), 15:449-481.
Halpin, John F. "Stalnaker's Conditional and Bell's Problem." Synthese (December 1986), 69(3):325-340.
Hanson, William H. "Indicative Conditionals are Truth-functional." Mind (January 1991), 100(397):53-72.
Hardegree, Gary M. "Stalnaker Conditionals and Quantum Logic." Journal of Philosophical Logic (November 1975), 4(4):399-421.
Harper, William. "A Note on Universal Instantiation in the Stalnaker Thomason Conditional Logic and M Type Modal Systems." Journal of Philosophical Logic (October 1974), 3(4):372-379.
Kvart, Igal. A Theory of Counterfactuals. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1986.
Palau, Gladys. "Condicionales Contrafácticos: Condiciones de verdad y semántica de mundos posibles. Acerca de las Teorías de R. Stalnaker y D. Lewis." Critica (April 1980), 12(34):5-.
Pendlebury, Michael. "The Projection Strategy and the Truth Conditions of Conditional Statements." Mind (April 1989), 98(390):179-205.
Perry, John. "From Worlds to Situations." Journal of Philosophical Logic (1986), 15:83-107.
Pizzi, Claudio. "Stalnaker-Lewis Conditionals: Three Grades of Holistic Involvment." Logique et Analyse (September-December 1990), 33(131-132):311-329.
Rehder, W. "Glimpses of the Disastrous Invasion of Philosophy by Logic." Logique et Analyse (1983), 26:227-239.
Tichy, Pavel. "A Counterexample to the Stalnaker-Lewis Analysis of Counterfactuals." Philosophical Studies (April 1976), 29(4):271-273.
Williamson, Timothy. "Bivalence and Subjunctive Conditionals." Synthese (1988), 75:405-421.