UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA IRVINE

DEPARTMENT OF LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

COLLOQUIUM

Mark Wilson

Department of Philosophy

University of Pittsburgh

Friday, February 23, 2001

3:00 p.m.

SST 777

Mark Wilson

1976

• "Physical Properties." Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1976.

1978

• Review of Paul Feyerabend's Against Method. Philosophical Review (January 1978), 87(1) [461]:106-108.

1979

• "Generality and Nomological Form." Philosophy of Science (March 1979), 46(1):161-164.

• "Maxwell's Condition--Goodman's Problem." British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (1979), 30:107-123.

1980

• "The Observational Uniqueness of Some Theories." Journal of Philosophy (April 1980), 77(4):208-233.

1981

• "The Double Standard in Ontology." Philosophical Studies (May 1981), 39(4):409-427.

1982

• "Predicate Meets Property." Philosophical Review (October 1982), 91(4) [479]:549-589.

1983

• "Why Contingent Identity is Necessary." Philosophical Studies (May 1983), 43(3):301-327.
       Abstract:"This paper argues that the principle of necessary identity (F)(G)(F=G then necessarily F=G) cannot be maintained, at least in second order form. A paradox based upon scientific definitional practice is introduced to demonstrate this. A non-Fregean reading of standard contingent identity semantics is provided to explain how such 'definition breaking' works."

1984

• Review of George Bealer's Quality and Concept. Philosophical Review (October 1984), 93(4):636-638.

1985

• "What Is This Thing Called 'Pain'? The Philosophy of Science Behind the Contemporary Debate." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (July-October 1985), 66(3-4):227-267.
        Special Double Issue: Topics in Philosophy of Science, edited by Geoffrey Joseph.

• "What Can Theory Tell Us About Observation?" In Paul M. Churchland, and Clifford A. Hooker, eds., Images of Science: Essays on Realism and Empiricism, with a Reply from Bas C. van Fraassen, pp. 222-242. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985.

1987

• Review of David Armstrong's What is a Law of Nature? Philosophical Review (July 1987), 96(3) [499]:435-441.

1988

• "Nature's Demands on Language." Philosophical Topics (Spring 1988), 16(1):285-336.
        Issue is on "Metaphysics."

1989

• Critical Notice: John Earman's A Primer on Determinism. Philosophy of Science (September 1989), 56(3):502-532.

1991

• "Law Along the Frontier: Differential Equations and Their Boundary Conditions." In Arthur Fine, Micky Forbes and Linda Wessels, eds., PSA 1990: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Volume Two: Symposium and Invited Papers, pp. 565-575. East Lansing, Michigan: Philosophy of Science Association, 1991.

• "Reflections on Strings." In Tamara Horowitz and Gerald J. Massey, eds., eds.,Thought Experiments in Science and Philosophy. Savage, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1991.
        Abstract: 'This essay discusses a famous case where the demands of physical representation overpowered the demands of mathematical rigor. It concerns the dispute between Euler and d'Alembert over the vibrating string."

1992

• "Frege: The Royal Road to Geometry." Nous (June 1992), 26(2):149-180.

1993

• "Honorable Intensions." In Steven J. Wagner and Richard Warner, eds., Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal, pp. 53-94. Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame University Press, 1993.

• "There's a Hole and a Bucket, Dear Leibniz." Midwest Studies in Philosophy (1993), 18:202-241.

1994

• "Can We Trust Logical Form?" Journal of Philosophy (October 1994), 91(10):519-544.

1995

• "Frege: The Royal Road to Geometry." In William Demopoulos, ed., Frege's Philosophy of Mathematics, pp. 108-149. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995.

1997

• "Mechanism and Fracture in Cartesian Physics." Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy (1997), 16(2):141-152.
       Topos: Descartes's Ontology, Guest editor: Alan Nelson.
       Abstract: "Descartes's claims about impact and the relativity of motion in the "Principles" have puzzled many commentators. The present essay attempts to relate his thinking to natural principles governing the capacity of a closed mechanism to perform work. A clever approach to fracture forms an important addendum to this account."

• "Wittgenstein, Physica Sunt, Non Leguntur." Philosophical Topics (Fall 1997), 25(2):289-316.
        Issue is on "Analytic Philosophy," edited by Christopher Hill.

1999

• "To Err is Humean." Philosophia Mathematica (October 1999), 7(3)Special Issue:247-257.
        Part of the George Boolos Memorial Symposium at Notre Dame, April 15-18, 1998.
       Abstract: "George Boolos, Crispin Wright, and others have demonstrated how most of Frege's treatment of arithmetic can be obtained from a second-order statement that Boolos dubbed 'Hume's principle'. This note explores the historical evidence that Frege originally planned to develop a philosophical approach to numbers in which Hume's principle is central, but this strategy was abandoned midway through his Grundlagen."

2000

• "Inference and Correlational Truth." In André Chapuis and Anil Gupta, eds., Circularity, Definition and Truth, pp. 370-395. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research; Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, 2000.

• "The Unreasonable Uncooperativeness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences." Monist (April 2000), 83(2):297-315.
        Issue is on "Applying Mathematics."

Forthcoming

• "Frege's Mathematical Setting." In Thomas G. Rickett's The Cambridge Companion to Frege. Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press.

• "The Mathematics of Spilt Milk."